Abstract: This paper presents empirical evidence supporting the view that US monetary conditions matter for firms in the global capital market in a recent period of great moderation. We show the effects of three risk measures, domestic bank interest rates spread, US bank interest rates spread, and US market price of interest rate risk on the value of firms and on the cross-listing decision of firms destined to three major markets in North America, Asia and Europe. The systematic risk comes from US monetary policy, while the local and US bank interest rates spreads contain their respective financial intermediation risk premiums. We use firm-level data in 29 countries of cross-listing origin over a six year period, from 2000 to 2005. We find consistent and robust evidence that the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio risk measure or market price of interest rate risk in the Sharpe sense provides an important benchmark for firm value across the universe of publicly traded companies.
Introduction
Open international capital markets have been instrumental in efficiently allocating risk and allowing firms to fulfil their capital investment demand. Also, systematic and credit risk measures may affect business investment through multiple channels. First, changes in market interest rates imply changes in the cost of capital, which in turn affect investment; the so-called interest channel. Second, changes in market interest rates affect the net cash flow available to a firm. Given imperfect capital markets, the availability of net cash flow will have an effect on investment. This is generally referred to as the broad credit channel. However, many other linkages exist between monetary conditions and real investment. Interest rate levels, risk measures such as banking spreads and monetary policy signal-to-noise ratios, contagion, leverage and liquidity effects are closely related to monetary policy activity and variability, and those measures can affect real investment. Report and Statistics (2006) In terms of publicly traded companies, real investment funds are not bounded by local stock markets but also include the possibility of firms seeking funds abroad by cross-listing in foreign stock exchanges. In this paper, we use firm-level data in 29 countries of cross-listing origin over a six year period, from 2000 to 2005 to study the effects of nominal variables on firm value and the firm's decision to cross-list abroad 1 . The time period of our analysis is one of great moderation in terms of interest rate spreads and market volatility thus, in our view, appropriate for measurement of US economic influence worldwide 2 . The evidence in this paper is based on firms cross-listed in a major North-American, Asian and European market. Table 1 shows top exchanges by total share trading value where the US markets in 2006 ranked first and second. This paper explores an empirical mechanism of monetary policy on the value of firms and thus real investment through interest rate channels. We consider the nominal interest rate level effects, the financial intermediation risk (measured by the banking interest rates spread) and systematic risk measures of monetary policy such as the signal-to-noise ratio of interest rates 3 . There is also a literature that examines the premium in market value of firms that cross list abroad. In particular, Doidge et al. (2004 Doidge et al. ( , 2009 ) provide evidence that cross-listing in the US stock exchange provides a significant premium in firm's market value; see also Bianconi and Tan (2010) . They attribute that premium to higher standards of corporate governance in the US. This evidence led us to seek measures of US monetary policy and others risk measures as benchmarks for the valuation of publicly traded firms around the world, and a potential important measure for firms that cross-list abroad. Hence, in addition to local measure of interest rates spread, we also include US interest rates spread and signal-to-noise ratio in interest rates as a benchmark. We find consistent and robust empirical evidence that the US market risk given by the federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio (in the Sharpe sense) provides an important benchmark for firm value across the world of publicly traded companies.
Our main question is whether or not three risk measures, the local interest rates spread (domestic credit and banking risks), the US interests spread (US non-financial firms credit and banking risks) and the US federal funds interest rate signal-to-noise ratio (US market risk) influence the valuation of firms worldwide and whether or not they influence the decision of firms to cross-list abroad for our sample of 29 countries in the 2000-2005 period, a relatively calm period in the US with some monetary easing and much lower interest rates volatility. We found that measures of contemporaneous and lagged local interest rate levels are irrelevant in the presence of measures of US interest rate levels; in particular the current and lagged US federal funds rate. However, when we add measures of local interest rates spread and US interest rates spread and US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio, the level effects of US nominal interest rates on firm value become irrelevant.
Our main results shed light on another angle of the effects of US monetary conditions on world capital markets. Basically, we find that when the US lowers the current (and lagged) federal funds interest rate level, but with much lower interest rates volatility (or the market price of interest rate increases in the Sharpe sense in the 2001-004 period), the market value of all firms decreases in the cross-country balanced panel. A potential transmission mechanism could be through the systematic and credit-bank risks in the US as compared to the ones in foreign countries. Suppose credit or market risk happens to be bigger in the local market relative to the one in the US; a domestic firm by cross-listing abroad could make arbitrage of these relative risks. Thus, a firm would save on risk premiums and could get capital at a lower cost abroad. Moreover, an increase in the US market interest rate risk depresses Tobin's q. As mentioned above, the data in this paper are from 2000-2005 and refer roughly to a US credit boom cycle. On the other hand, in times of a credit crunch, the effect should be reversed; see e.g., Lucas (1990) , Haslag and Young (1998) and He and Krishnamurthy (2008) .
More recently, during the subprime crisis, Taylor and Williams (2009) examine the recent increase in the US. TED (interest rates spread between overnight federal funds and longer term interbank loans) caused by counterparty risk, liquidity, leverage and others. They find that increased counterparty risk contributed to the rise in US bank interest rates spread, but their evidence is that US monetary intervention had no significant effect on mitigating the rise on spreads. We take this as evidence of the importance of both the financial intermediation risk and the market risk as measured respectively by the bank interest rates spread and the market price of interest rate risk (signal-to-noise ratios). This phenomenon has become a more important potential measure in understanding the non-neutralities of money; see IMF (2009) 4 .
We also present results of the effect of the both the market risk and the credit risk on the firm decision to cross-list. The US federal funds risk measure is significant for cross-listing decisions 5 . Our evidence on the determinants of cross listing from treatment effects also shows that, after controlling for selection bias, the premium to cross-list in the US versus Honk Kong and Germany is very different, and that geography and proximity play a significant role 6 . Countries in Asia and Europe tend to seek more funds abroad through cross-listing relative to other regions in this sample.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we discuss some basic theoretical models of relevance. Section 3 reviews institutional arrangements of cross-listing abroad (in the US, Hong Kong, and Germany). Section 4 describes the data while Section 5 presents the main empirical results. The last section offers concluding remarks. Tobin's (1969) portfolio choice model of the effects of money on real returns emphasised the wealth effect of monetary policy on asset prices. When the nominal money stock increases and/or the nominal interest rate decreases, asset prices increase and firm's q increase thus leading to an increase in the demand for real capital. The real effect occurs through a portfolio channel since money yields zero return and an increase in money increases the demand for other real assets thus decreasing real interest rates. However, this is the demand side effect. There is a capital supply effect in which lower real interest rates dampen asset yields, and thus the initial asset prices and firm value increases are dampened as well. Hence, from the supply side perspective, nominal interest rates and firm value should be positively correlated 7 . Another channel is the nominal interest rate effect on bank interest rates spread due to inflation tax on bank reserves, e.g., Haslag and Young (1998) and also Dotsey and Ireland (1998) . In particular, the effect of nominal interest rate on Tobin's q is that nominal interest rate spreads contain information about inflation. In particular, higher inflation implies higher spreads. As a consequence, higher spreads can discourage financial intermediation and lower investment thus affecting firm's market value. The effect of inflation on spreads is discussed in Lucas (2000), Haslag and Young (1998) and Yoshino (1993) .
Models
One of the main transmission mechanisms for the non-neutrality of money is through interest spreads, which may capture the credit risk premium due to non-performing loans to non-financial firms; see IMF (2009) . An increase in this risk premium causes banking disintermediation which can lower investment and affect firm's market value, e.g., Krishnamurthy (2008, 2009 ), Wongswan (2006) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) . There are several others sources of increases in banking interest rates spread in the asset pricing literature including bank operating costs, bank reserves, taxes, counterpart risk, liquidity, leverage and asset risk. In effect, banking interest rates spread may have higher information content than nominal interest rate levels per se. An ideal monetary policy would be characterised by the zero nominal interest rate à la Friedman (1969) optimum quantity of money and also by its low noise. In other words, monetary policy can be characterised not only by zero nominal interest rate level, but also by the lowest risk premium component in the bank interest rates spread. Volatility of interest rates matters due to the phenomenon of asset and liability mismatching in terms of maturity and interest rates. In the realm of publicly traded companies, the top exchanges are in the US, see Table 1 ; and the US is the largest economy in the world. Hence, US monetary policy can have an impact on firm value that goes beyond its own borders, due to foreign firms demand for capital in the large stock exchanges through ADRs, over the counter trade, cross listing and other mechanisms. In particular, US interest rate policy can generate fluctuations in the value of firms and in the demand for funds in foreign exchange markets through these channels, see e.g., IMF (2009), Taylor (2009) , Taylor and Williams (2009) . Given the recent attention to interest spreads and risk premium, monetary policy can be characterised by the nominal federal funds rate and the market price of interest rate risk 8 . In Figure 1 , we note the observed lower average US federal funds rate as well as a much lower volatility relative to its average rate in the 2000-2005 periods, mainly after the 11 September event, which is consistent with lower expected inflation as well. In particular, we note that the US federal funds signal to noise ratio has a hump between 2001 and 2004 indicating that the decline in volatility is much larger than the average rate. The prime rate on loans-fed funds spread declines after 2001 indicating that AAA non-financial firms in the US enjoyed favourable borrowing conditions in this period, which makes much more difficult for foreign firms to compete in the US capital market, hence a potential lower probability of cross-listing.
The main test of this paper is whether the local interest rate level, local credit risk given by interest rates spread, US credit risk and US nominal monetary measures can affect the firm values across countries and the decision to cross-list. Our empirical strategy is to estimate the monetary nominal effects on firm's q in two ways. First, we measure the nominal monetary effects on the value of the firm directly, controlling for cross-listing. Second, we estimate the direct effect of nominal monetary effects on cross-listing as a treatment, and then the nominal monetary effects on firm's q controlling for the cross-listing treatment. One of our main results is that there is significant benchmarking by publicly traded firms in US fed funds risk measure.
A brief overview of international cross-listings
Firms tend to cross-list abroad for four common reasons. 9 Market segmentation allows investors to escape cross-border barriers to investment. Liquidity effects reduce costs in the sense that the greater liquidity the lower the spreads. The information or signalling hypothesis is based on the premise that cross-listing signals market participants about the financial health of the firm. Finally, the corporate governance hypothesis or 'bonding' assumes that firms, whom domestically have poor governance standards, often list their securities on countries with more rigorous governance procedures 10 . The US, Hong Kong and Germany are the three destination markets for cross-listing focused in this study 11 . In the US, American depositary receipts (ADRs) is the primary way for foreign firms to cross-list. It is a negotiable certificate that represents a foreign company's public traded equity. Depositary receipts are made when brokers purchase a company's shares on the respective domestic home stock market followed by delivering it to the depositary's local custodian bank, such as Goldman Sachs, Union Bank of California, State Street, etc.
In Hong Kong, the stock market is operated by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). The SEHK is a wholly owned subsidiary of the HK Exchange. Securities transactions on the SEHK are executed by the Automatic Order Matching and Execution System (AMS). The Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), launched by the SEHK, serves as a conduit where emerging enterprises, which do not fulfil the profitability or track record requirements of the existing market of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, can obtain a listing and increase capital. To cross-list in Hong Kong, firms can list either on the Main Board or with GEM.
In Germany, firms can cross-list on either the EU-regulated market or the open market. A listing on the regulated market leads to the general standard or its prime standard segment, while admission to trading on the regulated unofficial market leads to the open market with its entry standard segment.
Generally speaking, the listing requirements for cross-listing in Hong Kong and Germany are less stringent than in the US. Another factor to consider are the listing costs.
Entry fees for the US are nearly three times the cost for listing in Germany, and nearly four times that of Hong Kong 12 .
Data
We start by defining firm's q. It measures the valuation of firms, computed often as total value divided by total assets. In our analysis, following Doidge et al. (2004) , we calculate q as follows:
Total Liability Market Capitalization q Total Assets
For firm i in year t, where the denominator is the firm's book value of total assets and the numerator is the firm's book value of total liability plus its market capitalisation. Market capitalisation is computed as the firm's common shares outstanding multiplied by its current market price. We follow Hirsch and Seaks (1993) and use the logarithm of q in the empirical analysis. All financial information used above is obtained at the fiscal year-end from 1999 to 2004 13 . The sample firms' financial information comes from the WorldScope (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) database. We focus on the origin countries of firms that were cross-listed in the US, Hong Kong, and Germany. Table 2 presents the 29 countries of origin of firms, their distribution across regions as well and cross-listing information and cross-listing by destination 14 . Table 2 Countries of origin in the sample We started with a data set over the six year period of 90,418 data points. Then, we excluded observations from the finance, insurance, and real estate industries by eliminating firms that have two-digit SIC code from 60 to 67. This is because the valuation ratios of financial institutions are usually not comparable to those of non-financial firms. We compiled the firms that were only listed on their domestic exchanges with 54,885 total firms. We obtained the firms cross-listed in the US via the CompuStat World Database. After finding the names of the cross-listed firms, we then matched names with the WorldScope Database in order to compile the financial information. If the firm's name or financial data was not available, then the firm was omitted. In order to maintain consistency, any new listing from a different foreign country over the six year period of time was omitted.
The firms cross-listed in Hong Kong and Germany were found via the Hang Seng index website for Hong Kong and the Dusseldorf and Frankfort exchange websites (Xetra) for Germany. We included the Dusseldorf exchange as well because it is a private exchange that deals in private issues. Owing to the fact that we also included private ADRs, we deemed it necessary to include the Dusseldorf exchange. Private listings crosslisted on the Hong Kong Exchange were also included. After finding the names, we again matched names with the WorldScope database in order to compile the financial information necessary. We followed La Porta et al. (2002) and, to reduce the weight of outliers, maintained q at the second and 98th percentiles by setting extreme values to the second and 98th percentile values, respectively. We then eliminated twin firms, or firms that cross-listed in more than one of the three destination markets. At this point, we had an unbalanced panel data set with 48,307 observations in the firm and time dimension 15 . Finally, we reduced the sample by considering each firm that had observations in all years. As a result, we obtained a balanced panel of 15,882 observations. In this sample there are 2,647 firms per year over the six year period; in 2000, 177 were cross-listed, 160 in 2001 160 in , 126 in 2002 160 in , 120 in 2003 160 in , 94 in 2004 160 in and 104 in 2005 160 in . Overall, 1970 firms are not cross-listed; 677 firms are cross-listed with 335 in the US, 55 in Hong Kong and 287 in Germany in the period. Table 2 presents further information of cross-listing by destination and by geographic region 16 . Besides the dummy variables for cross-listing, we also include several firm-level, country-level and region variables as controls. We introduce two-digit SIC code dummies to control for industry effects. Twenty and hundred are dummy variables used to represent firm size based on asset amounts. A value of 1 was given if a firm that has more than $20 million in total assets and $100 million respectively. GDPG is the GDP growth rate of the firm's source country differentiated by year, thus controlling for some macroeconomic factors. Data for the country-level variable GDP growth was obtained from the IMF website, the IMF world development indicator report.
For each country, the source for interest rates spread data is the IFS -International Financial Statistics of the IMF and local Central Bank data. The local interest rate spread is the difference between the certificate of deposits (CD) rate and the money market rate. This spread measures the local bank risk premium since the deposit rate is the banking lending rate and the money market rate is the rate that banks borrow from one another.
For the US, the interest rate data is from the Federal Reserve Board. The US spread is the difference between the prime rate on loans, the main banking lending rate for AAA non-financial firms and the federal funds rate, the main inter-banking rate in the US. The signal-to-noise ratio is the 12 month average federal funds rate minus Friedman's (1969) optimum zero nominal interest rate divided by its standard deviation for that year. This measure captures the US interest market risk. Table 3 present the definition of variables. Tables 4 and 5 the summary statistics and the correlation matrix. First, we note that the average q in the sample is 1.16, the average local interest spread is -0.77 percentage points, the average US prime-federal funds rate spread is 2.995 percentage points and the average US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio is 7.7. The standard deviation of the local spread is about 1.5% while for the US prime over fed funds rate is about two-tenths of a percent. We also note in Table 5 that the unconditional correlation between log q and local interest spread is negative and about -14%, with the US prime-federal funds rate spread small and negative -4%, and with the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio an even smaller negative -1.5%. The unconditional correlation between cross-listing and local interest spread is small and negative and about -3.2%, with the US prime-federal funds rate spread small and positive 2.7%, and with the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio it is positive and small 3%. Figure 2 shows a graph of firm value q, the local interest spread, the US spread and the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio by country. Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela in South America; China, Korea India and Philippines in Asia; and Hungary and Portugal in Europe all have lower and less disperse firm q value. Japan, Singapore and Israel in Asia; South Africa in Africa; Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, CH and the UK in Europe, Brazil in South America; Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania all have higher and more disperse firm q value in this period. The variability of the local spread is large in Argentina and Mexico. The variability of the US prime over fed funds rate spread is very small while the fed funds rate signal-to-noise ratio has more variability, from a peak of over 16 in 2000 to about five in 2005. Figure 3 shows predicted q conditional on the interest spreads and US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio for the cross listed and non-cross-listed samples. The cross-listed sample does predict a higher firm value as is well documented in the literature. Finally, Figure 4 shows a graph of the probability of cross-listing conditional on the three risk measures, the local interest spread, the US prime spread and US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio. Note that the year labels indicate that the predicted probabilities of cross-listing were higher in the early years and lower towards later years in the sample, particularly 2005. This sample period is reminiscent of the burst of the dot.com bubble and its effect on worldwide capital markets; and the falling probability of cross-listing reflects this effect.
Figure 4 Probability of cross-listing conditional on interest spreads and Fedcmv
Note: Based on probit model conditional on contemporaneous dep_mkt, prime_fed, fed_mcv.
Econometric models and empirical results
We have a balanced dynamic panel where each firm is counted only in one country of origin each year. First, we ran several models using the large unbalanced panel (48,307 observations) including local nominal interest rate levels and monetary growth data. We found that local nominal interest rates have a positive contemporaneous effect on firm value with evidence in favour of a positive relationship between firm value and the local nominal interest rate. This is consistent with the supply side effect that higher nominal interest rates can lead to higher real interest rates and higher capital supply via firm's market valuation 17 . However, when adding measures of local spreads and US federal funds spread and signal-to-noise ratio, the level effects become irrelevant.
We proceeded using the balanced panel (15,882 observations) to measure the effects of local spreads and US federal funds spread and signal-to-noise ratio on firm value controlling for cross-listing. We separate the sample based upon cross-listing destination; and later consider sub-samples by firm size according to total assets. We then measure effects of local spreads and US federal funds spread and US fed funds signal-to-noise ratio on the decision to cross list and the effects on firm value.
Panel and dynamic panel regressions
We apply two basic methods, panel fixed effects, and the Arellano and Bond (1991) where i indexes the company and t indexes the year and c indexes the country. X itc is a vector of controls which includes cross-listing status, Sarbanes-Oxley, geographic region, SIC industry code dummies, growth of GDP, firm size, country and time trend effects.
The main hypotheses refer to the signs and magnitudes of the β 3 ,…,β 7 . The variable GDPG (growth of GDP) is used to control for country macroeconomic factors. Size refers to the variables Twenty and Hundred, used to control for firm size and thus try to capture growth opportunity of the firm. Specification (2)-(3) refers to overall effects on valuation, and we also condition on cross-listing destination. We also use the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel estimation since we have a small number of years and a large number of firms. The results for specifications (2)-(3) are shown in Tables 6   18   .  Table 6 columns 1 and 2 refer to the relationship between nominal risk measures and firm value for the general panel. The regressions include all controls and interaction terms. The first main result (column 1) is that the current and lagged US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio (in the Sharpe sense) have a significant negative effect on firm value across countries, while the (current and lagged) local spread and the (lagged) US prime rate minus federal funds rate spread are not significant. There is robust evidence that US fed funds interest market risk benchmarking is occurring during this period. An increase of one unit in the US interest market risk (contemporaneous average US federal funds rate relative to its volatility) decreases the value of firm on average by 1.1-1.2%, say from q = 1.012 to q = 1.0. In the dynamic panel model, column (2), this effect is almost similar for the lagged US. fed funds risk measure indicating persistent and cumulative effects. Secondly, the cross-listing premium is significant and well identified, when controlling for the monetary risk factors, interactions and all other controls. The magnitudes are much larger as expected; about 12.3% in the dynamic panel model 19 .
Columns 3-8 present results conditional on cross-listing in one of the three destinations: US, Hong-Kong and Germany; thus capturing North America, Asia and Europe destination effects. The main identification results of columns (1) and (2) continue to hold. In the US destination, columns (3) and (4), the US fed funds risk benchmarking and the cross-listing premium effects are very similar to the overall sample. In addition, the (lagged) US prime rate-federal funds rate spread in the US destination is significant, a one tenth of a percent (one standard deviation) decline in the (lagged) US prime rate on loans-federal funds rate spread, increases the value of firms in the US destination by 3.4%.
Table 6
General models and by destination (8) Notes: Controls: size = twenty, hundred; industry = SIC code dummies; growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP; time trend. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, Levin-Lin-Chu panel unit-root test for logtobinq: t-star= -239.6, P > t: 0.0000.
General models and by destination (continued) The destinations of Hong Kong and Germany follow 20 . In the Hong Kong destination, the US fed funds risk benchmarking is occurring significantly with magnitudes similar to the overall sample. There is also benchmarking in the (lagged) US prime rate-federal funds rate spread in the Hong Kong destination. Cross-listing in Hong Kong commands a large and significant discount between 19%-26%. In Table 2 , we note that the great majority of firms that cross list in Hong Kong are from China, followed by a few firms from Japan and Singapore and one from Ireland. The discount in our 2000-2005 sample is occurring predominantly for Chinese firms that cross-list in Hong Kong 21 .
In the Germany destination, the results are consistent with the overall sample. The US fed funds risk benchmarking is occurring significantly with magnitudes similar to the overall sample and there is not benchmarking in the (lagged) US prime rate-federal funds rate spread in the Germany destination. Cross-listing in Germany commands a significant premium between 5%-7%. Given that most firms that cross-list in Germany are from Asia and Europe (see Table 2 ), that corporate governance in Germany is less stringent than the US, and that the costs to cross list in Germany are much smaller relative to the US, we infer that one potential important reason for a premium in the Germany destination is the signalling effect of a firm's potential earnings.
Overall in Table 6 , we find consistent and robust evidence that the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio (in the Sharpe sense) risk measure provides an important benchmark for firm value across the universe of publicly traded companies. The local source nation interest rate spread is not significant in all cases; and the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy as well. Table 7 General models by size Notes: TA = total assets controls: industry = SIC code dummy; growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP; time trend *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Table 7
General models by size (continued) Notes: TA = total assets controls: industry = SIC code dummy; growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP; time trend *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
In Table 7 , we consider sub-samples by firm size according to total assets: 1 less than US $20 million 2 between US $20 and US $100 million 3 greater than US $100 million (all in 2005 US dollars).
The table shows the general case with all available controls. There are much more large firms in the sample, followed by about less than half medium sized firms and less than one fourth small firms relative to large firms. Columns (1)- (2) show the sub-sample of total assets less than US $20 million, say small firms. The panel fixed effects case does identify the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio effect between -2.4% and the dynamic panel of the order of -1.8%. The US spread and the local spreads are insignificant. The cross-listing effect is significant ranging from 8.1% to 22.8%. The interaction term between cross-listing and the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio is significant. The value of a small firm that is cross-listed is much more sensitive to the US fed funds rate risk measure than one that is not cross-listed, an order of magnitude of -12.7% on average in the panel case only.
Columns (3)- (4) show the sub-sample of total assets more than US $20 million and less than US $100 million, the medium sized firms. The panel fixed effects case identifies the contemporaneous US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio of about -0.9% and the dynamic panel of the order of -1.1%; much smaller than the effect for small firms. The cross-listing premium is not significant, but the domestic credit risk is significant in the dynamic panel case in this set of firms. Thus, for medium sized firms the lower the local money market rate (credit risk) the higher the value of firms.
In columns (5)- (6), the sub-sample of total assets more than US $100 million or large firms, the contemporaneous US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio of about -0.8% and the dynamic panel of the order of -1.0%, close to the effect on the medium sized firms. The cross-listing effect is significant ranging from 7.1% to 12.0%. The interaction term between cross-listing and the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio is also significant in this case. The value of a large firm that is cross-listed is more sensitive to the US fed funds rate risk measure than one that is not cross-listed, an order of magnitude of -0.7% to -1.1% on average in the panel and dynamic panel cases.
From a perspective of size, the contemporaneous effect of the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio and the cross-listing premium are larger in magnitude for smaller firms with total assets less than US $20 million in the sample. In addition, smaller firms that cross-list are more sensitive to the US fed funds risk measure. For the larger firms, those results are qualitatively similar but with a lower order of magnitude. While the medium sized firms show effects of the US fed funds rate risk measure similar to the large firms in magnitude, we do not find a significant cross-listing premium for this set of firms. Our main finding here is that smaller firms, and larger firms to a lower order of magnitude tend to be more sensitive to the US fed funds rate risk measure and the ones that are cross-listed are even more sensitive to the US risk benchmark. Medium sized firms do not share this evidence though. For the few small firms that achieve cross-listing, the gains in value are potentially large, reflecting a potential expected high growth effect when firms are small and cross-list. Large firms benefit from cross-listing as well. However, medium sized firms do not have a cross-listing premium in our sample. Those firms may have passed the small size threshold and cross-listing may not reflect much potential expected high growth as a small firm does.
Treatment effects
We can think of firms that cross list as the ones that receive a treatment relative to the ones that do not cross list. Firms with higher market value may gain more benefits from cross-listing than the costs borne onto them through the added disclosure requirements. Local and US interest rate spreads and US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio may affect the decision of firms to cross list abroad. Lower liquidity in domestic markets may lead firms to seek funds abroad through cross listing. We apply treatment effect methods where each firm has a valuation outcome with and without this treatment. We use the consistent two-step estimator 22 . 
where (4a) is the decision on the unobserved latent variable, Ф is the standard normal c.d.f in the probit model, and (4b) is the valuation equation; X″ and Z are controls. The valuation equation includes the inverse Mills ratio λ which measures the extent and direction in which unobserved factors that make cross-listing more likely to occur are associated with valuations. Identification is through lagged local and US interest rates spreads (local and US credit risks) and lagged US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio (US interest market risk). (1) shows that the contemporaneous and lagged US prime rate-fed funds spread (US credit risk premium) and the contemporaneous and lagged US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio (US interest market risk) are both significant in determining a firm decision to cross-list abroad; but the local interest rates spread (local bank risk) does not influence the probability of cross-listing. In the period 2001-2005, a decrease in the contemporaneous US non-financial AAA firm credit risk premium decreases the probability of cross listing by a larger magnitude than the increasing lagged effect, thus the net effect is negative. According to Figure 1 , the conditions for US firms in this period were favourable from the perspective of US lending, a decline in the US prime rate-fed funds rate in the period (US firms became less risk) decreases the probability of cross listing by a foreign firm. The effect of the US federal funds signal-to-noise ratio is also positive in net terms; a reduction in US market price of interest risk (much lower interest rates volatility relative to its mean) decreases the probability of cross listing by foreign firms in the global market. In addition, geographic location does matter for the decision to cross-list. Firms located in Asia and in Europe are more likely to cross-list relative to firms from other regions.
Column (2) shows the valuation equation (Tobin's q) where the US risk measures results are consistent with previous findings. The US prime rate on loans-federal funds rate spread and federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio is negative and significant, but the local interest spread is not significant. This latter spread represents the local bank risk premium (CD rate minus risk free interest rate). If this premium increases, the value of firms decreases due to bigger costs of capital, while the higher US interest market risk decreases the firm's Tobin q. In other words, a lower US nominal interest rate combined with its own much lower volatility increases the risk management costs in terms of asset and liability mismatching in the firm's balance sheet. The coefficient on λ is positive and significant indicating that unobserved factors lead to an increase in the probability of cross-listings when firm valuations are high. Notes: Controls: industry = SIC code dummy; growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP; time trend; size = twenty, hundred. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, robust. Table 8 shows that after controlling for the selection bias, the cross-listing premium is no longer significant, and there is a negative premium of -0.064 on firm value for those firms that cross-list. This stands in contrast to Doidge et al. (2004) findings. One potential explanation could be that Germany and Hong Kong do not have the same 'cross-listing' premium as the US. We report in Table 9 the two-step estimation for just the US listing destination. Indeed, the premium after controlling for selection bias is positive and statistically significant. To sum, whether a firm cross-lists in the US or Hong Kong or Germany imply very different cross-listing premiums after controlling for selection bias. US monetary risk measures and the geographic location do matter for the decision to cross-list 23 .
Summary and conclusions
We provided evidence of nominal effects on firm value and cross-listing decisions worldwide using dynamic panel data methods and treatment effects methods. We presented empirical models using a sample of 29 countries where firms cross-listed in a major North-American, Asian and European market for the period 2000-2005. Our results on the value of firms are as follows. In Table 6 , we find consistent and robust evidence that the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio (in the Sharpe sense) risk measure provides an important benchmark for firm value across the universe of publicly traded companies. Higher US market price of interest rate decreases the firm value across countries. Thus, foreign firms avoid cross-listing abroad due to bigger US costs of funding. However, the local source nation interest rates spread (local bank risk premium) is not significant in all cases. The cross listing premium is significant and robust in general and for the US and Germany destinations, but negative for the Hong Kong destination.
From a perspective of size (Table 7) , our evidence on firm value show that the contemporaneous effect of the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio and the cross-listing premium are larger in magnitude for smaller firms with total assets less than US$20 million in the sample. In addition, smaller firms that cross-list is more sensitive to the US fed funds risk measure. For the larger firms, those results are qualitatively similar but with a lower order of magnitude. Although the medium sized firms are sensitive to the US fed funds rate risk measure in a similar fashion as large firms in magnitude, we do not find a significant cross-listing premium for this set of firms. Our main finding here is that smaller firms, and larger firms to a lower order of magnitude, tend to be more sensitive to the US fed funds rate risk measure and the ones that are cross-listed are even more sensitive to the US fed funds risk benchmark.
Our evidence on the determinants of cross listing from treatment effects shows that whether a firm cross-lists in the US or Hong Kong or Germany imply very different cross-listing premiums after controlling for selection bias. US monetary risk measures and geography play a significant role as well. In Table 8 , a decrease in the contemporaneous US non-financial AAA firm credit risk premium gives a net decrease the probability of cross listing because conditions for domestic US firms in this period were favourable from the perspective of US lending. The effect of the US federal funds signal-to-noise ratio is also positive in net terms. Countries in Asia and Europe tend to seek more funds abroad through cross-listing relative to other regions in this sample.
The small time and large cross-sectional dimensions make the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel methodology appropriate. On the other hand, we only included country and industry-level effects, but not firm level characteristics. A fruitful avenue for future research would be to expand the time period and the number of firms and origin and destination markets to better understand the interest risk effect on the cross-listing decision of firms during the more recent business cycle.
Notes

1
Several studies have examined the influence of US monetary policy on US stock prices. First, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) discuss the hypothesis that investors irrationally discount real cash flows using nominal interest rates implying that stock markets will be undervalued during periods of high expected inflation and overvalued during periods of low expected inflation. More recently, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) show that cyclical, capital-intensive industrial sectors and financially constrained firms react more strongly to US monetary policy. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show that US monetary policy shocks affect domestic stock markets mainly through their effects on risk premiums. Wongswan (2006) finds that global equity indexes mainly react to the Fed's target rate surprises rather than path surprises. See also Azar (2010) on inflation and stock returns and Nguyen and Schuessler (2014) on the impact of key multiples on returns. 2 Mayer and Scharler (2010) find that the great moderation can be attributed to a less activist monetary policy in the US. Thus our study here provides an important measurement of the US economic influence abroad at a period when US monetary policy is not prominent. 3
The financial intermediation risk is composed by both the bank risk and the credit risk. Bank risk is measured by the spread between the domestic CD rate and money market rate. The
